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ABSTRACT 
 
Based on a sample of Korean firms listed on the KOSPI and KOSDAQ from 2001 to 2011, we 
examined whether the affiliation of a firm with a Chaebol group affects the sensitivity of stock 
prices to earnings surprises. We found that the market response to positive (negative) earnings 
surprises is more positive (negative) for Chaebol firms than for non-Chaebol firms. In addition, 
we investigated how intra-group transactions affect the ERCs of Chaebol firms by comparing with 
those of non-Chaebol firms. Our results show that the intra-group transactions of Chaebol firms 
are positively related to ERCs under both positive and negative earnings surprises. However, we 
did not find the same results from the analyses of non-Chaebol firms. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
he aim of this study is to examine how differently the market reacts to earnings surprises of Chaebol 
firms compared to those of non-Chaebol firms. Although there is no official definition of Chaebol, 
firms are perceived as Chaebol if they consist of a large group and operate in many different 
industries, maintain substantial business ties with other firms in their group, and are controlled by the largest 
shareholder as a whole. The definition used to identify Chaebol firms is that of a large business group established by 
the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) and a group of companies of which more than 30% of the shares are 
owned by the group’s controlling shareholders and its affiliated companies. According to a report from the KFTC, 
51 groups have been designated as large business groups, including 1,740 listed and non-listed firms.
1 
In 2011, 
Chaebol firms accounted for three quarters of all market value in Korea. Chaebol firms contributed to boosting 
Korea's export-driven economy in recent decades and overcoming the Asian currency crisis in the late 1990s but 
have become a target of public criticism over their perceived abuses of economic power. Regardless of which view 
one holds of Chaebol firms in the Korean economy, market participants are interested in Chaebol firms. Due to the 
significance of Chaebol firms to the Korean economy, their decisions and strategies function as milestones of the 
economy. Information on Chaebol firms is easily obtained from the media and official resources such as the KFTC. 
This means that Chaebol firms have a better information environment than non-Chaebol firms. We examined 
whether the affiliation of a firm with a Chaebol group influences the sensitivity of stock prices to earnings surprises. 
We predicted that the Earnings Response Coefficients (ERCs) of Chaebol firms would show different patterns from 
those of non-Chaebol firms. 
 
Additionally, we investigated how intra-group transactions affect the ERC of Chaebol firms and whether 
there is a difference with non-Chaebol firms. One of the distinct strategies of a Chaebol is decision making at the 
whole group level using affiliates. Even though each firm in a Chaebol group has an independent statutory status and 
system, they are run for the maximization of the group value, including all affiliates in the group, not for the 
maximization of the individual value of the firm. Park et al. (1997) found that a Chaebol firm makes decisions that 
maximize the size of the whole group, and the Korea Development Institute (KDI) reported on the influence of the 
                                           
1 http://groupopni.ftc.go.kr/ 
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controlling shareholders over firms in the group (KDI report, 2003). As a result, intra-group transactions are easily 
utilized for the goal of the controlling shareholders of Chaebol firms. The ratio of intra-group transactions among 
the affiliates of a Chaebol in Korea has increased over the past years.
2
 This implies that intra-group transactions are 
an essential strategy of a Chaebol to achieve the goals of the controlling shareholder. Intra-group transactions under 
the influence of the controlling shareholders have both positive and negative aspects (Bae & Park, 2009). 
 
At first, the controlling shareholders have incentives to increase their wealth by transferring some value to 
other group firms (Johnson et al., 2000). To describe the transfer of resources out of firms for the benefit of the 
controlling shareholders, Johnson et al. (2000) used the term “tunneling.” Not only other minority shareholders but 
also creditors may lose their wealth from the decreases in value of a single firm caused by tunneling activities 
directed by controlling shareholders. As empirical evidence, Bae et al. (2002) found that while the minority 
shareholders of a firm within a Chaebol may lose from an acquisition, the controlling shareholders benefit because 
the acquisition enhances the value of the other firms in the group. In contrast, the group structure of a Chaebol can 
add value to a member firm by providing intra-group equity investments, low-interest loans, and cross-debt 
guarantees, namely “propping.” Friedman et al. (2003) used “propping” to describe the injection of private cash 
from an entrepreneur into an affiliated firm with outside investors. The resources to prop up the troubled firm need 
not only come from the private property (i.e., purchase or buy an asset of the affiliated firm at a price lower or 
higher than fair value) of the controlling shareholders. Other healthier affiliates can be utilized to support the target 
firm. This study examined how intra-group transactions affect the market response to earnings surprises. We expect 
that the reaction of market participants to intra-group transactions of non-Chaebol firms is different from that of 
Chaebol firms due to the unique structure of a Chaebol which makes possible “tunneling” or “propping.” 
 
Our results show that market response to positive (negative) earnings surprises is more positive (negative) 
for Chaebol firms. One possible explanation for this result can be a better information environment and less 
information uncertainty. Second, intra-group transactions of Chaebol firms are positively related to ERCs. 
Specifically, Chaebol firms with greater intra-group transactions show larger ERCs under positive earnings surprises, 
while they show smaller ERCs under negative earnings surprises. However, we found that intra-group transactions 
have no effect on the ERCs in non-Chaebol firms. This result indicates that investors expect or recognize the 
“propping” effect that maintains or increases the value of a firm in case of bad news from Chaebol firms. 
 
This study contributes to the literature on Chaebol firms in two ways. First, we identified that Chaebol 
firms have larger ERCs than non-Chaebol firms, and this result is supported regardless of the type of news, good or 
bad. A previous study could not find evidence that Chaebol firms exhibit larger ERCs than non-Chaebol firms after 
controlling for the size effect (Lee, 1993). Second, we extend studies on ERCs of Chaebol firms by including intra-
group transactions as one of the determinants of the market response. We expect future studies to explore what 
causes the larger ERCs of Chaebol firms in terms of the information environment and the direct connections 
between intra-group transactions and “propping.” 
 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and develops the 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the sample selection and research methodology. Section 4 reports our main results, 
and the final section summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Literature on Earnings Response Coefficient 
 
Since Ball and Brown (1968), many financial accounting researchers have examined the ERC, which is 
defined as the effect of a $1 change in earnings on the dollar stock returns. The ERC is the slope coefficient for the 
regression of returns for the change in earnings. Major studies in the capital market area have focused on the 
                                           
2According to a report by the Fair Trade Commission (FTC), the so-called inter-affiliate contracts of 46 business groups came to 186.3 trillion 
won ($164.1 billion), or 13.2 percent of their total combined sales of 1,407.2 trillion won. That is up from 12 percent tallied a year earlier, and the 
amount also represented a 28.7 percent increase over the same period. Those figures are based on a review of sales and contract data compiled 
from 1,373 affiliates of business groups until the end of May 2012 (The Korea Times, 2012.8.30.). 
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determinants of the ERC. The overall findings of these studies suggest that the ERC is positively related to earnings 
persistence and growth and negatively related to beta and the risk-free interest rate (Kormendi & Lipe, 1987; Easton 
& Zmijewski, 1989; Collins & Kothari, 1989). 
 
In the same context, researchers have examined whether stock price reactions to earnings surprises are 
related to the quality of the reported earnings numbers (Imhoff & Lobo, 1992; Lee & Sami, 1998). Some studies 
have attempted to analyze the difference in market reaction with regards to the sign of the news. For example, Basu 
(1997) showed that firms with positive (negative) unexpected earnings, meaning good news (bad news), have 
positive (negative) excess returns. In addition, Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) found that stock price 
sensitivity to good earnings news is higher during high sentiment periods than during low sentiment periods, 
whereas stock price sensitivity to bad earnings news is higher during low sentiment periods than during high 
sentiment periods. 
 
2.2 Literature on Chaebol 
 
Due to the unique ownership structure, extant studies on Chaebol firms have focused on the relation 
between the value of firms and Chaebol affiliation. Ferris et al. (2003) found a negative effect of Chaebol 
membership on a firm’s value. Lee et al. (2011) showed that high insider ownership and Chaebol affiliation reduce a 
firm’s value. However, Kim et al. (2011) examined the influence of ownership-control disparity on a firm’s value, 
but they could not find any significant correlation between them. 
 
In particular, a large body of studies have examined “tunneling” and “propping” among Chaebol firms. 
“Tunneling” occurs when the controlling shareholders increase their wealth by transferring some value to other 
group firms (Johnson et al., 2000). The tunneling effect has been reported for various situations. Bae et al. (2002) 
found that while the minority shareholders of a firm within a Chaebol may lose from an acquisition, the controlling 
shareholders benefit because the acquisition enhances the value of the other firms in the group. Baek et al. (2006) 
showed that Chaebol firms offering private securities to group affiliates set the offering prices to benefit their 
controlling shareholders. In contrast, Friedman et al. (2003) used “propping” to describe the injection of an 
entrepreneur’s private cash into an affiliated firm with outside investors. In the same context, Riyanto and Toolsema 
(2008) identified “propping” as a form of inter-group insurance in case of financial distress. As evidence of 
recognition of “propping” by the market, Bae et al. (2008) found that the announcement of increased earnings by a 
Chaebol firm has a positive effect on the market value of other affiliates in the group. 
 
Studying the market’s evaluation of Chaebol affiliation, Lee (1993) reported that Chaebol firms exhibit 
larger ERCs than non-affiliated firms due to the monopoly power of Chaebol firms. However, after controlling for 
size, Chaebol firms did not show any significant correlation. On the other hand, Yoon and Huh (1998) reported that 
growth and Chaebol affiliation have a positive effect on ERC. 
 
2.3 Literature on Intra-Group Transactions 
 
According to IAS 24, a person or entity is related to a reporting entity if that person or entity has control or 
joint control of the reporting entity, or if that person or entity has significant influence over the reporting entity. As 
such, we can define intra-group transactions as transactions among firms in the same Chaebol group. The controlling 
shareholder of the Chaebol group has substantial power to make decisions at the whole group level and an incentive 
to maximize its wealth by managing earnings through intra-group transactions. 
 
Extant studies have examined the effect of intra-group transactions on the aspects of earnings management 
and market response. Kim and Woo (2008) examined the relationship between the transactions of related parties and 
earnings management. They found that discretionary accruals become larger as the transactions of related parties 
increase. In addition, the ERC is smaller when the size of the transactions of related parties is relatively large, which 
implies that the investors evaluate the transactions of related parties negatively. Choi (2010) examined the 
association between the transactions of related parties, such as the sale of goods and credit offerings among affiliates 
and stock return. The results showed that the sales of the related party are not related to stock returns, while the 
accounts receivables of the related party are negatively correlated with stock price. 
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Chang et al. (2000) examined the economic performance of Chaebol firms by explicitly addressing group 
wide resource-sharing and intra-group transactions. The results showed that group-affiliated firms benefit from 
group membership because they share intangible assets and financial resources with other member firms. Lee (2006) 
reported a negative effect of the transactions of related parties on a firm’s value regardless of Chaebol affiliation. 
This is inconsistent with Kim and Woo’s (2008) study, which did not find a negative evaluation of the market for 
Chaebol firms. 
 
2.4 Hypotheses Development 
 
Investors make decisions based on available information and are affected by behavioral biases. Mian and 
Sankaraguruswamy (2012) found that market-wide investor sentiment influences the stock price sensitivity to firm-
specific earnings news, which implies the existence of behavioral biases by investors. Specifically, the ERC for good 
earnings news is higher during high sentiment periods than during low sentiment periods, whereas the ERC for bad 
earnings news is higher during low sentiment periods than during high sentiment periods. Similarly, whether a firm 
is a member of a Chaebol affects the response of investors to earnings surprises after controlling for other 
determinants of ERC such as size and risks. Chaebol firms receive more attention from the public, including 
investors and regulators, than non-Chaebol firms. Therefore, investors are able to access information about Chaebol 
firms not only from annual reports but also from the media without consuming considerable time and effort.
3
 Given 
the more available information compared to non-Chaebol firms, we expect that information uncertainty can be 
reduced for Chaebol firms. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The ERC of a Chaebol firm for positive (negative) earnings surprises is significantly different 
from that of a non-Chaebol firm. 
 
A Chaebol establishes its goals and executes its strategies at the group level rather than at the individual 
firm level. This implies that a large portion of intra-group transactions can be used to adjust the performance of 
individual firms to achieve operational and financial goals intended by the controlling shareholders. Chaebol firms 
are exposed to the risk of “tunneling” and to the advantage of “propping” facilitated by intra-group transactions. 
Intra-group transactions can decrease the value of a firm because of the controlling shareholders’ pursuit of private 
profit (called “tunneling”) and cause a negative market response to earnings news. On the other hand, intra-group 
transactions are used to prop up distressed firms or relatively weak affiliated firms by supporting their operations or 
making additional investments. 
 
However, intra-group transactions are not an exclusive strategy of Chaebol firms. Non-Chaebol firms also 
have various types of related parties, including subsidiaries and associates, involved in related party transactions. 
Kim and Woo (2008) analyzed a single regression irrespective of the sign of earnings surprises and found that the 
ERC is lower when the size of the related party transactions is large. This result indicates that investors evaluate the 
related party transactions negatively. However, this result is only applicable to non-Chaebol firms and implies that 
the intra-group transactions of non-Chaebol firms deliver different signals to investors due to the limited information 
available compared to Chaebol firms. 
 
Due to the mixed effects of “tunneling” and “propping” of Chaebol firms, we do not predict the direction of 
the net effect of intra-group transactions on the ERC. Additionally, we predict that how and to what extent intra-
group transactions affect ERCs are different depending on the sign of the earnings surprises and whether a firm 
belongs to a Chaebol. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: The ERCs of Chaebol (non-Chaebol) firms vary depending on intra-group transactions. 
Hypothesis 2b: The effects of intra-group transactions on the ERCs of Chaebol (non-Chaebol) firms for positive 
earnings surprises are different from the ERCs for negative earnings surprises. 
 
 
 
                                           
3 http://www.chaebul.com/ is a portal website providing comprehensive information about Chaebol. 
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
To examine whether Chaebol firms have different ERCs for earnings surprises compared to non-Chaebol 
firms, we constructed basic Model (1). Then, to investigate ERCs for positive and negative earnings surprises 
separately, we developed basic Model (1) into Model (1a) and Model (1b). 
 
SARi,t  = a0 + b1UEi,t + b2UEi,t × CHAEBOLi,t + b3CHAEBOLi,t + b4SIZEi,t + b5LEVi,t + b6BMi,t +  
b7MKi,t + ΣβjINDi,t + ΣβkYDi,t + εi,t Model (1) 
 
SARi,t = a0 + b1UEUPi,t + b2UEUPi,t × CHAEBOLi,t + b3CHAEBOLi,t + b4SIZEi,t + b5LEVi,t + b6BMi,t +  
b7MKi,t + ΣβjINDi,t + ΣβkYDi,t + εi,t Model (1a) 
 
SARi,t = a0 + b1UEDOWNi,t + b2UEDOWNi,t × CHAEBOLi,t + b3CHAEBOLi,t + b4SIZEi,t + b5LEVi,t +  
b6BMi,t + b7MKi,t + ΣβjINDi,t + ΣβkYDi,t + εi,t Model (1b) 
 
Where, 
 
SAR Size-adjusted abnormal return 
UE Unexpected net income scaled by total asset of t-1 
UEUP Positive unexpected net income 
UEDOWN Negative unexpected net income 
CHAEBOL An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is an affiliate of a   Chaebol, 0 otherwise 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets 
LEV Total debt/Net assets 
BM Market capitalization/Book value 
MK  An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is listed on KOSPI, 0 otherwise 
IND Industry dummy 
YD Year dummy 
 
SAR is the size adjusted return cumulated over a 12-month period ending three months after the company’s 
fiscal year-end. We selected this period to ensure that information on earnings surprises and intra-group transactions 
reported in the firm’s annual report is available to the market. SAR is free of the size effect because these returns are 
computed after subtracting the returns on a portfolio of stocks that are similar in size. CHAEBOL is an indicator 
variable which takes the value of 1 if a firm is an affiliate of a Chaebol group. The ERC of a Chaebol firm is the sum 
of b1 and b2. We included LEV as a control variable to reflect the result of a previous study that showed low 
leveraged firms have a larger ERC than that of high leveraged firms (Dahliwal et al., 1991). In addition, we added 
SIZE and BM into the model to control for the effects of firm size and growth on the ERC (Collins & Kothari, 1989). 
Finally, we included an indicator variable MK to identify in which market a firm is listed to control for market 
specific effects. 
 
To test Hypothesis 2, we estimated Model (2) including TRANS. TRANS is an indicator variable that 
represents whether the size of the intra-group transactions is larger than the median of the total samples’ intra-group 
transactions. We measured the intra-group transactions by calculating the net effect of the intra-group transaction on 
a firm’s profitability. Specifically, we deducted the purchases and expenses from the revenue and other gains and 
then, scaled this by the total revenue of the firm. We included the same control variables as in Model (1) and ran 
Model (2) independently for Chaebol firms and non-Chaebol firms. To investigate the effect of the sign of earnings 
surprises, we examined Model (2a) and (2b), respectively. 
 
SARi,t = a0 + b1UEi,t + b2UEi,t ×TRANSi,t  + b3TRANSi,t +b4SIZEi,t+ b5LEVi,t + b6BMi,t  + b7MKi,t +  
ΣβjINDi,t + ΣβkYDi,t + εi,t  Model (2) 
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SARi,t = a0 + b1UEUPi,t + b2UEUPi,t ×TRANSi,t  + b3TRANSi,t +b4SIZEi,t+ b5LEVi,t + b6BMi,t  +  
b7MKi,t + ΣβjINDi,t + ΣβkYDi,t + εi,t Model (2a) 
 
SARi,t = a0 + b1UEDOWNi,t + b2UEDOWNi,t ×TRANSi,t  + b3TRANSi,t +b4SIZEi,t+ b5LEVi,t +  
b6BMi,t  + b7MKi,t + ΣβjINDi,t + ΣβkYDi,t + εi,t  Model (2b) 
 
Where, 
 
SAR Size-adjusted abnormal return 
UE Unexpected net income scaled by total asset of t-1 
UEUP Positive unexpected net income 
UEDOWN Negative unexpected net income 
TRANS 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the intra-group transactions are larger than the 
median of the year, 0 otherwise 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets 
LEV Total debt/Net assets 
BM Market capitalization/Book value 
MK An indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is listed on KOSPI, 0 otherwise 
IND Industry dummy 
YD Year dummy 
 
4. SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
4.1 Sample Selection 
 
Our sample consisted of firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) and the Korea Securities Dealers 
Automated (KOSDAQ) during the period 2001-2011. We obtained financial data from KIS-VALUE, which 
provides the financial statements of all listed firms, and analyst forecasts from the Fn-Guide. For comparability, we 
deleted firms with non-December fiscal year-ends and all firms in which total liabilities were larger than the total 
assets. This screening procedure yielded a total of 10,794 firm-year observations. Table 1 presents the sample 
selection criteria and the number of excluded firms to arrive at our final sample. 
 
Table 1: Sample Selection 
Sample Selection Criteria N 
Firm-years with December fiscal year-ends and listed on the KSE during the period 2001-2011. 22,651 
(Less) Firm-years without intra-group transaction data from the Korea Listed Companies Association4 (7,978) 
(Less) Firm-years without data from KIS-VALUE and Fn-Guide (3,782) 
(Less) Firm-years in which total liabilities were larger than the total assets (48) 
(Less) Firm-years with issues for administration (49) 
Total number of firm-years in the final sample 10,794 
 
4.2 Definition of Chaebol 
 
Each year, the KFTC ranks business groups by the size of their total assets and identifies the 30 largest 
groups. We used the website operated by the Korean Fair Trade Commission to obtain a list of Chaebol firms. Table 
2 presents the distribution of our sample firms (Chaebol and non-Chaebol). As can be seen in Panel A, a total of 
1,631 firms are classified as Chaebol firms and account for 15 percent of our sample. In addition, Panel A shows 
that 86% of the Chaebol firms are listed on the KSE, whereas the portion of non-Chaebol firms listed on the KSE is 
only 45%. In Panel B of Table 2, we summarize the industrial composition of our sample. 
 
                                           
4 Excluded firm-year that all amounts of sales, account payables, revenues, and expenses are zero in intra-group transactions. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – September/October 2014 Volume 30, Number 5 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 1531 The Clute Institute 
Table 2: The Distribution of Sample Firms 
Panel A: The Distribution of Sample Firms by Year and Listed Market 
Year 
Chaebol Firms Non-Chaebol Firms 
KSE KOSDAQ Total KSE KOSDAQ Total 
2001 55 5 60 336 189 525 
2002 105 13 118 318 267 585 
2003 114 16 130 338 342 680 
2004 121 15 136 343 371 714 
2005 123 16 139 347 401 748 
2006 136 28 164 372 459 831 
2007 145 26 171 386 501 887 
2008 165 37 202 380 547 927 
2009 138 25 163 427 599 1,026 
2010 141 26 167 436 651 1,087 
2011 155 26 181 438 715 1,153 
Total 1,398(86%) 233(14%) 1,631 4,121(45%) 5,042(55%) 9,163 
Panel B. The distribution of sample firms by industry 
Industry Description 
Chaebol Firms Non-Chaebol Firms 
N % N % 
Food, beverages and tobacco products 68 4.17 409 4.46 
Textile and leather products 21 1.29 344 3.75 
Wood, pulp and paper products 13 0.80 287 3.13 
Chemicals and chemical products 170 10.42 627 6.84 
Medicine and Medical Supplies Products 19 1.16 511 5.58 
Rubber and plastics products 20 1.23 243 2.65 
Non-metallic mineral products 56 3.43 243 2.65 
Primary metal and fabricated metal products 132 8.09 730 7.97 
Electronic component and communication equipment products 130 7.97 1,332 14.54 
Electrical machinery and apparatuses products 44 2.70 539 5.88 
Other machinery and equipment products 54 3.31 655 7.15 
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment products 85 5.21 543 5.93 
Construction 159 9.75 268 2.92 
Wholesale and retail trade 191 11.71 608 6.64 
Transportation 78 4.78 134 1.46 
Publishing business 15 0.92 405 4.42 
Professional services 179 10.97 525 5.73 
Others 197 12.08 760 8.29 
Total 1,631 100 9,163 100 
 
5. RESULTS 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analyses. Size-adjusted returns, SARi,t, 
have been winsorized at 1 percent and 99 percent of the respective distribution to mitigate the impact of outliers. 
The mean of the size-adjusted returns was 0.048, which represents the average response to positive, negative, and 
no-news surprises. The positive mean of 0.008 for earnings surprises, UE , indicates that the earnings news have, 
on average, been positive. However, when we divide the sample into positive and negative earnings surprises, we 
note that the mean magnitude of the two sub-groups, UEUP[>0] and UEDOWN[<0], was 0.077, -0.072, respectively, 
suggesting that the overall positive mean of UE is due to the greater preponderance of positive news in our sample. 
CHAEBOL is an indicator set to 1 if the firm is a Chaebol firm and 0 otherwise. The mean CHAEBOL was 0.151. 
This finding suggests that about 15 percent of our sample firms are classified as Chaebol firms. Table 3 also 
provides statistics on the control variable. The control variables include measures such as firm size (SIZE) measured 
as the natural logarithm of the total assets, the market-to-book ratio (MB), an indicator set to 1 if the firms are listed 
on the KSE and 0 otherwise (MK), and a leverage as the total debt divided by the net assets (LEV). To control or 
mitigate industry and time-series effects, we added an industry dummy and year dummy for the regression analysis. 
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Table 3: Summary of the Statistics 
Variables N Mean Std. p25 p50 p75 
SAR 10,794 0.048 0.551 -0.271 -0.045 0.219 
UE 10,794 0.008 0.261 -0.032 0.002 0.035 
UEUP 5,637 0.077 0.135 0.013 0.033 0.080 
UEDOWN 5,157 -0.072 0.119 -0.081 -0.035 -0.013 
CHAEBOL 10,794 0.151 0.358 0.000 0.000 0.000 
TRANS 10,794 0.500 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
SIZE 10,794 25.731 1.433 24.749 25.435 26.398 
LEV 10,794 1.084 1.345 0.372 0.748 1.323 
MB 10,794 1.731 1.651 0.747 1.300 2.172 
MK 10,794 0.511 0.500 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Note: The sample consists of 10,794 firms between 2001 and 2011. All firms are publicly traded. SAR is the size adjusted return cumulated over the 12-month period 
ending three months after the company’s fiscal year-end. SAR is free of the size effect because these returns are computed after subtracting the returns on a portfolio 
of stocks that are similar in size. The control variables include measures such as firm size (SIZE) measured as the natural logarithm of the total assets, the market-to-
book ratio (MB), an indicator set to 1 if the firms listed on the KSE and 0 otherwise (MK), and a leverage as the total debt divided by the net assets (LEV). To control 
or mitigate industry and time-series effects, we added an industry dummy and year dummy for the repression analysis. 
 
Table 4 provides the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficient for the various combinations of control 
and test variables. SAR is significantly positively correlated with CHAEBOL. SAR is significantly correlated with 
TRANS, LEV, and MK with a negative sign. 
 
Table 4: Correlations 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
(1)SAR 
 
0.087 0.023 0.012 0.046 -0.029 0.125 -0.036 
(2)UE 0.312 
 
0.001 0.002 -0.015 -0.013 0.045 -0.002 
(3)CHAEBOL 0.032 0.029 
 
0.087 0.588 0.076 -0.015 0.292 
(4)TRANS 0.001 -0.005 0.072 
 
0.021 -0.007 -0.012 -0.048 
(5)SIZE 0.086 0.023 0.474 0.009 
 
0.138 0.106 0.539 
(6)LEV -0.034 -0.031 0.131 0.003 0.208 
 
-0.040 0.080 
(7)BM 0.171 0.134 -0.055 -0.006 0.162 -0.030 
 
0.247 
(8)MK -0.020 0.022 0.292 -0.056 0.574 0.114 0.271 
 
Note: This table reports pairwise Pearson (Spearman) correlation coefficients above (below) the diagonal for the firms in our dataset. The bold 
values are significant at 5% or less. The definitions of the variables are the same as before. 
 
Table 5 reports the results of the univariate tests on the differences between Chaebol firms and non-
Chaebol firms. Firm size, measured by market capitalization and total assets, is much larger for Chaebol firms than 
for non-Chaebol firms. This is consistent with the market distribution of Chaebol firms skewed to the KSE. In 
addition, SAR is significantly larger for Chaebol firms (0.078) than for non-Chaebol firms (0.043). Leverage 
measured by the ratio of the total debt to the market value of equity is also significantly different between the groups. 
The mean (median) leverage ratios for Chaebol firms and non-Chaebol firms are 1.327 (1.030) and 1.041 (0.706), 
respectively. The mean (median) TRANS for Chaebol firms and non-Chaebol firms are 0.070 (0.007) and 0.014 (-
0.001), which indicates that Chaebol firms execute more intra-group transactions. These differences are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. However, UE and BM are not significantly different between the groups. 
 
Table 5: Univariate Analysis 
Variables 
Chaebol Firms (N = 1,631) Non-Chaebol Firms (N = 9,163) 
T-test 
Mean Median Mean Median 
SAR 0.078 -0.032 0.043 -0.048 2.39 ** 
UE 0.009 0.005 0.008 0.001 0.11 
 
TRANS 0.070 0.010 0.014 -0.001 7.92 *** 
SIZE 27.727 27.756 25.376 25.254 57.07 *** 
LEV 1.327 1.030 1.041 0.706 7.94 *** 
BM 1.670 1.128 1.741 1.330 1.45 
 
MK 0.857 1.000 0.450 0.000 40.31 *** 
Note: The definition of variables is described in Table 3. ***, **, * represent p < .01, p < .05, and p < .10, respectively (two-tailed). 
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5.2 Regression Analysis 
 
Table 6 presents the results for the test of our first hypothesis from the regression analysis based on 
Equations (1), (1a), and (1b). The coefficients of UE, UEUP, and UEDOWN capture the stock price response to 
earnings surprises in the case of non-Chaebol firms. Our primary focus in Table 6 is on the interactions of UE (UP 
and DOWN) and Chaebol that capture the differences in the ERC between Chaebol and non-Chaebol firms. The 
positive coefficient of the interaction variables indicates that the stock price changes more when a firm belongs to a 
Chaebol. 
 
Table 6: ERCs of Chaebol Firms for Earnings Surprises 
SARi,t  = a0 + b1UEi,t + b2UEi,t × CHAEBOLi,t + b3CHAEBOLi,t + b4SIZEi,t + b5LEVi,t + b6BMi,t + b7MKi,t + ΣβjINDi,t + 
ΣβkYDi,t + εi,t (1) 
SARi,t  = a0 + b1UEUPi,t + b2UEUPi,t × CHAEBOLi,t + b3CHAEBOLi,t + b4SIZEi,t + b5LEVi,t + b6BMi,t + b7MKi,t + ΣβjINDi,t 
+ ΣβkYDi,t + εi,t (1a) 
SARi,t  = a0 + b1UEDOWNi,t + b2UEDOWNi,t × CHAEBOLi,t + b3CHAEBOLi,t + b4SIZEi,t + b5LEVi,t + b6BMi,t + b7MKi,t + 
ΣβjINDi,t + ΣβkYDi,t + εi,t (1b) 
 (1) (1a) (1b) 
 
Coefficient t-Statistics Coefficient t-Statistics Coefficient t-Statistics 
Intercept -0.936 *** -6.99 -0.973 *** -4.84 -0.625 *** -3.67 
UE 0.150 *** 7.49 
      
UEUP 
   
0.041  0.66    
UEDOWN 
      
0.297 *** 5.16 
UE×CHAEBOL 2.574 *** 9.56 
      
UEUP×CHAEBOL 
   
1.200 *** 2.92 
   
UEDOWN×CHAE
BOL       
0.792 ** 2.22 
CHAEBOL -0.004  -0.20 -0.036  -1.10 0.025  0.89 
SIZE 0.036 *** 6.81 0.044 *** 5.57 0.019 *** 2.77 
LEV -0.009 ** -2.17 -0.008  -1.28 -0.001  -0.20 
BM 0.052 *** 14.31 0.045 *** 9.27 0.044 *** 8.27 
MK -0.142 *** -10.61 -0.178 *** -8.91 -0.097 *** -5.93 
Year Dummy Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included 
N 10,794 5,637 5,157 
Adj R2 0.049 0.043 0.043 
F-value 17.44*** 8.47*** 7.74*** 
Note: The sample consists of 10,794 firms between 2001 and 2011. All firms are publicly traded. The independent variable is the size adjusted 
return cumulated over the 12-month period ending three months after the company’s fiscal year-end. T-Statistics are in parentheses. 
 
We predict that the ERC of a Chaebol firm for positive (negative) earnings surprises will be significantly 
different from that of a non-Chaebol firm. As seen in Table 6, before partitioning the sample according to the sign of 
the earnings surprises, we run the regression analysis by including the whole sample. The first two columns of Table 
6 show that both coefficients of UE and the interaction of UE and Chaebol are positive. The positive coefficient of 
UE is consistent with a large body of prior literature stating that earnings surprises cause a significant response from 
stock prices. The positive coefficient of the interaction of the UE and Chaebol indicates that the market response to 
earnings surprises is stronger for Chaebol firms. This result is still supported when we divided our total sample into 
two sub-groups: one group with positive earnings surprises and the other group with negative earnings surprises. 
The results show that both coefficients for the UEUP × CHAEBOL and UEDOWN × CHAEBOL are significantly 
positive (significant at the 1% level). This means that the stock price of Chaebol firms increase more when there are 
positive earnings surprises, whereas it declines more in the case of negative earnings surprises. 
 
In summary, our results are consistent with our expectation that investors react differently to the earnings 
surprises of Chaebol firms. One possible explanation for the greater reaction to news on Chaebol firms could be 
because of a better information environment formed by a greater following of analysts and more interests from the 
media. In addition, it can be inferred that “tunneling” or “propping” intended by controlling shareholders affects the 
decisions of investors. By examining our second hypothesis which includes intra-group transactions as an additional 
explanation variable, we will further discuss “tunneling” and “propping.” 
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Next, we examine whether market reactions vary depending on intra-group transactions. We estimated 
equations (2), (2a), and (2b), respectively, for Chaebol firms and non-Chaebol firms. Intra-group transactions are 
perceived by external auditors and regulators as risk areas where a material misstatement could occur. As such, we 
expect that market participants respond to earnings surprises differently by evaluating the nature and size of the 
intra-group transactions. Hypothesis 2a predicts that intra-group transactions affect the ERCs of the Chaebol (Non-
Chaebol) firms. Furthermore, we expect that the effects of the intra-group transactions are different according to the 
sign of earnings surprises as stated by Hypothesis 2b. 
 
Table 7 shows the results separately for Chaebol firms and non-Chaebol firms. The coefficients of the UE × 
TRANS are positive for both Chaebol firms and non-Chaebol firms, which means that the market reaction to 
earnings surprises is greater with larger intra-group transitions. This is consistent with our prediction that the level of 
intra-group transactions differentiates ERCs. When we run the regression analysis of (2a) and (2b) for each 
subgroup, the results show different implications for Chaebol firms and non-Chaebol firms. 
 
The coefficient of UEUP × TRANS for Chaebol firms under positive earnings surprises is significantly 
positive, whereas that for non-Chaebol firms does not show any statistically meaningful relation. The result suggests 
that the market interprets earnings surprises with large intra-group transactions positively only in the case of 
Chaebol firms. This difference is also found in negative earnings surprises. As can be seen in the Table 7 on the left 
side, the coefficient of UEDOWN × TRANS is significantly negative, which means that the market reacts weaker to 
negative earnings surprises of Chaebol firms when there are large intra-group transactions. However, we cannot find 
the same results from the analysis of non-chaebol firms. From the different responses of the market to negative 
earnings surprises, “propping” effects can be inferred. This can be interpreted as investors of Chaebol firms do not 
evaluate earnings surprises negatively as much as those of non-Chaebol firms do because they expect that Chaebol 
firms receive operational or financial support from other affiliates in the Chaebol group. Those types of support are 
provided in the form of intra-group transactions. 
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Table 7: The ERCs of Chaebol Firms According to Intra-Group Transactions 
SARi,t = a0 + b1UEi,t + b2UEi,t ×TRANSi,t + b3TRANSi,t +b4SIZEi,t+ b5LEVi,t + b6BMi,t  + b7MKi,t + ΣβjINDi,t + ΣβkYDi,t + εi,t (2) 
SARi,t = a0 + b1UEUPi,t + b2UEUPi,t ×TRANSi,t + b3TRANSi,t +b4SIZEi,t+ b5LEVi,t + b6BMi,t  + b7MKi,t + ΣβjINDi,t + ΣβkYDi,t + εi,t (2a) 
SARi,t = a0 + b1UEDOWNi,t + b2UEDOWNi,t ×TRANSi,t + b3TRANSi,t +b4SIZEi,t+ b5LEVi,t + b6BMi,t  + b7MKi,t + ΣβjINDi,t + ΣβkYDi,t + εi,t (2b) 
 Chaebol Firms Non-Chaebol Firms 
 (2) (2a) (2b) (2) (2a) (2b) 
 Coefficient t-Stat. Coefficient t-Stat. Coefficient t-Stat. Coefficient t t-Stat. Coefficient t-Stat. Coefficient t-Stat. 
Intercept -0.127  -0.47 0.561  1.41 -0.452  -1.30 -1.331 
*** -8.13 -1.601 *** -6.40 -0.756 *** -3.64 
UE 0.545 *** 2.84 
      
0.036  1.58       
UEUP 
   
-0.428  -1.29       
0.104  1.27    
UEDOWN 
      
2.162 *** 4.45 
      
0.301 *** 3.7858 
UE×TRANS 0.767 ** 2.45 
      
0.964 *** 11.97 
      
UEUP×TRANS 
   
1.044 ** 2.20 
      
-0.037  -0.27    
UEDOWN×TRANS 
      
-2.095 *** -3.68 
      
-0.009  -0.07 
TRANS 0.025  0.91 0.007  0.16 -0.087 
** -2.04 -0.014  -1.23 0.020  0.96 -0.032 
* -1.91 
SIZE 0.005  0.49 -0.011  -0.78 0.010  0.80 0.053 
*** 8.11 0.070 *** 7.03 0.025 *** 3.04 
LEV 0.015  1.42 0.027 
* 1.76 0.015  1.09 -0.012 
*** -2.87 -0.014 ** -2.02 -0.004  -0.71 
BM 0.061 *** 7.42 0.066 *** 6.17 0.044 *** 3.50 0.045 *** 10.87 0.035 *** 6.33 0.044 *** 7.24 
MK -0.189 *** -4.37 -0.223 *** -3.67 -0.131 ** -2.32 -0.146 *** -10.21 -0.177 *** -8.22 -0.101 *** -5.77 
Year Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummy Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 1,631 921 710 9,163 4,716 4,447 
Adj R2 0.098 0.115 0.040 0.054 0.039 0.046 
F-value 6.23*** 4.53*** 1.87*** 16.42*** 6.55*** 7.24*** 
Note: The sample consists of 10,794 firms between 2001 and 2011. All firms are publicly traded. The independent variable is the size adjusted return cumulated over the 12-month period ending three 
months after the company’s fiscal year-end. T-Statistics are in parentheses. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
We investigated how being an affiliate of a Chaebol group affects the sensitivity of stock prices to earnings 
surprises using firms listed on the KOSPI and KOSDAQ from 2001 to 2011. In addition, we analyzed to what extent 
intra-group transactions affect the ERCs of Chaebol firms compared to non-Chaebol firms. Our results show that the 
market response to positive (negative) earnings surprises is more positive (negative) for Chaebol firms than for non-
Chaebol firms after controlling for other determinants of ERC. Second, we found evidence that, when there are large 
intra-group transactions, the market reacts more positively to the earnings surprises of Chaebol firms. Specifically, 
for Chaebol firms, the ERCs for positive earnings surprises are greater, while those for negative earnings surprises 
are smaller. We developed and extended extant research by examining the ERCs of Chaebol firms for positive and 
negative earnings surprises separately while considering intra-group transactions. We expect our results to serve as a 
starting point for other studies on what makes investors react differently to earnings surprises and how intra-group 
transactions work on market responses. Acknowledgment of “tunneling” and “propping” by investors may be one 
explanation for the distinction between the ERCs of Chaebol firms and non-Chaebol firms. 
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